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CONTRIBUTORY AND VICARIOUS COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT IN COMPUTER SOFTWARE
HARMING ONE FORM OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BY PROTECTING ANOTHER
Robert M. Hirning*
Introduction
"From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response
to significant changes in technology."
1I
Two theories of copyright infringement liability, contributory and vicarious
infringement, 2 have undergone major changes in the last 20 years, as infringement liability has
been extended to manufacturers and distributors of various consumer products. Accordingly,
copyright infringement liability has become increasingly applied to various computer
technologies, particularly today's popular peer-to-peer file sharing software.
3
The effect of indirect infringement liability on the development and use of these
products' underlying technology has yet to be fully determined. Today, contributory and
vicarious copyright infringement are more likely to be imposed as a result of the distributor's
actions promoting infringement, rather than based on specific properties of the infringing
technology. As more products exhibit significant legitimate uses in addition to potentially
infringing uses, the question of legality and liability becomes increasingly important.
This note will examine the effect of imposing indirect copyright infringement liability on
computer software and other abstract forms of developing technology. This examination will
focus on how the traditional goals and interpretation of copyright protection conflict with the
progression of computer technology development.
Part I of this note describes the background and history of the development of indirect
infringement law.4 Part II describes how infringement liability has affected various computer
technologies and seeks to extract the outstanding issues from recent Supreme Court holdings.
5
Part III describes the specific infringement issues which arise through the use and development
of software, including the legality of the popular BitTorrent software. 6 Part IV specifically
* J.D. Candidate 2007, William Mitchell College of Law; B.S., Computer Science, North Dakota State University,
2003. The author wishes to thank Amanda for her invaluable encouragement and assistance.
' Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984).
2 Contributory copyright infringement is defined as either actively inducing, causing, or materially contributing to
the infringing conduct of another person, or providing the goods and means necessary to help another person
infringe. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 796 (8th ed. 2004). Vicarious copyright infringement, instead, is a person's
liability for an infringing act of someone else, even though that person has not directly committed an act of
infringement. Id. at 797.
3 See infra Part I.D-E.
4 See infra Part I.
5 See infra Part II.
6 See infra Part III.
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details the ways in which these infringement issues are encountered by different types of
software developers and proposes ways in which they may be avoided.7 This note concludes that
the expansion of indirect infringement has had unintended results for both the software industry
and end users, which may require statutory intervention by Congress to resolve copyright's
conflicting results.
8
I. Background
The statutory copyright protection established by Congress9 does not hold a party liable
for acts of infringement committed by another party. 10 Rather, because of Congress' failure to
prescribe an indirect infringement remedy, theories of contributory and vicarious infringement
developed as common law doctrines and became the most effective methods in controlling
widespread end-user infringement activity. 11
A. Development of Contributory and Vicarious Infringement
Contributory infringement liability first occurred in cases such as those where a promoter
became liable for providing infringing music compositions to performers, even though the
performers committed the infringing act.12 Thus, the promoter became liable as a contributoryinfringer for intentionally inducing or encouraging another's direct infringement. 13
Liability for contributory infringement occurs either through personal conduct
encouraging or assisting the infringement or through the provision of machinery or goods
facilitating the infringement. 14 Contributory infringement also normally requires that the
contributory infringer knowingly aid or induce the infringing act.
15
Vicarious infringement liability similarly developed through famous "dance hall" cases,
where courts used the theory to hold dance hall operators liable for profiting from infringing acts
of hired performers. 16 Such liability occurred even though the vicariously liable party may not
have had actual knowledge of infringement. 17
7 See infra Part IV.
8 See infra Conclusion.
9 Congress has been given authority to create copyright laws and prescribe the exclusive remedies for copyright
infringement. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
'0 Statutory copyright law only imposes liability against the party who directly infringes on the exclusive rights of
the copyright owner. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (a) (2006).
11 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2776 (2005).
12 Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1161 62 (2d Cir. 1971).
13 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2776; see Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162.
14 Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1998).
15 Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162. See generally Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Liability as "Vicarious" or
"Contributory" Jnfringer Under Federal Copyright Act, 14 A.L.R. FED. 825 (2005).
16 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963); see also 14 A.L.R. FED. 825,
supra note 15, at § 3-4.
17 Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162. Even in the absence of a special relationship, vicarious liability may be imposed if
the person had the ability to supervise the infringing activity, or had a direct financial interest in such activity.
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 316 F.2d at 307.
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Vicarious liability simply requires that one profits from direct infringement while
declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it.18 Normally, this is a higher standard to meet than
contributory infringement, but in some factual situations where knowledge of the specific
infringing act is lacking or incomplete, imposing liability vicariously may be the only viable
theory.19
The Supreme Court itself has noted in dicta that "the lines between direct infringement,
contributory infringement, and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn," requiring the full
analysis and consideration of each particular case.20 Both theories are important when examining
the overall scope of copyright infringement liability, and in this paper will be collectively
referred to as indirect infringement liability.
B. Sony Betamax
Many cases in the 2 0th century examined indirect copyright infringement, often focusing
on entities which facilitated the unauthorized performance of copyrighted music. 21 The Supreme
Court, however, did not examine the issue of indirect infringement liability against a product
distributor until 1984 in Sony v. Universal City Studios.
22
Sony involved the potential infringement liability of a Betamax video cassette recorder
(VCR) distributed by the Sony Corporation. 2 3 The home consumer of the VCR was responsible
for the infringing act by using the VCR to record copyrighted television broadcasts. 24 Since
imposition of liability on so many consumers was impracticable, two movie companies sought to
halt the marketing and distribution of the popular product. 25
The Supreme Court held that "[tihe Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone
liable for infringement committed by another." 26 The distribution of products which facilitated
infringement could not constitute contributory infringement if the product was "widely used for
legitimate, unobjectionable purposes." 27
18 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2776 (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co, 316 F.2d at 307).
19 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 316 F.2d at 307. However, some exceptions may exist to impose liability for
contributory infringement, even in the absence of knowledge of the infringing act. See infra Part II.B. 1.
20 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 n.17 (1984).
21 See id. at 438 n. 18 (listing notable contributory and vicarious liability infringement cases).
22 See id. at 417. The majority in Sony noted that attempting the imposition of liability on a product distributor was
"unprecedented" and a "novel theory of law." Cf id. at 457 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (alleging that infringement
claims in Sony were similar to many other copyright cases).
23 Betamax was produced by Sony, and was the first widely-adopted consumer video recording system. See
Wikipedia, Betamax, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Betamax (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). The competing format of the
VHS video cassette recorder eventually became more popular with consumers, leading to the demise of the Betamax
format. Id.
24 Sony, 464 U.S. at 420.
25 Id. By the time of the Sony decision, Sony had manufactured and distributed millions of Betamax video cassette
recorders. Id. at 422.26 Id. at 434; see also 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006) (imposing statutory infringement liability only on persons who
directly infringe copyrighted works).
27 Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. Sony only examined contributory infringement liability, as a vicarious liability theory was
outright rejected. See id. at 439.
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The Court held that the primary use of the Betamax VCR, recording television programs
to replay later, was a legitimate fair use.28 Whether the amount of legitimate use was
"substantial," however, was questionable. 29 Nonetheless, the Court seemed to establish an
appreciable standard of preventing distributor liability for many potentially infringing products.
C. Computer Networks and Infringement
Just as consumers' television-watching habits challenged copyright infringement law, the
propagation of the personal computer also provided an opportunity for home users to abuse
copyrighted digital works. Through the rise of computer networks and the Internet, millions of
users began to easily and inexpensively exchange digital files of copyrighted pictures, music,
movies, and software.
30
Early litigation involving network operators' liability for users' infringing acts did not
seem to establish clear standards. Some courts imposed contributory infringement liability even
though network operators lacked direct control of their users' activities. 3 1 The more likely result,
however, was allowing network operators to escape liability if they had no notice of
infringement. The developing law recognized that a network which merely enabled users to
infringe copyrights was conceptually similar to an owner of a copying machine letting the public
make copies with it.
32
Based on this standard, Congress modified the Copyright Act in 1998 to specifically
exempt Internet service providers from infringement liability, provided that specific steps were
taken by the service provider to stop and identify the infringement. 33 This exemption, however,
only applied to digital communication services, and not necessarily the underlying software
technology which enabled the infringement.
34
D. Napster and File Sharing Technologies
2 81 d. at 456.
29 Only an estimated 9% of Betamax recordings were programming authorized by the copyright holder to be
recorded. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2788 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
30 Sharing of copyrighted materials through computer networks occurred long before the introduction of the World
Wide Web and standalone computer software programs such as Napster. See M. David Dobbins, Computer Bulletin
Board Operator Liability for Users' Infringing Acts, 94 MICH. L. REV. 217, 218 19 (1995); Sega Enters., Ltd. v.
Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679, 687 (N.D.Cal. 1994) (finding online bulletin board operator liable for infringement by
allowing distribution of computer games).31 See Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 686 87; Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1555 56 (M.D.Fla. 1993)
(copyright and trademark infringement liability imposed on computer bulletin board operator who hosted copyright
holder's pictures).
32 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1369 (N.D.Cal. 1995). The
online service in this case continued to allow a user use its network after being notified of infringing activities,
which subjected the service to potential contributory infringement liability. Id. at 1373. The service argued,
unsuccessfully, that it should receive a complete exemption from liability since it was a "common carrier that
merely acts as a passive conduit for information." Id. at 1369 n. 12.33 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
34 Id. at § 512(k)(1).
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The availability of infringing content did not explode until the late 1990s, when programs
were specifically developed to share and download digital media files. One of the first popular
file sharing programs, Napster, was a stand-alone software program which allowed users to find
and download copies of popular music, shared by other users.35 Such technology became dubbed
a "peer-to-peer" network, due to the individual users being responsible for exchanging files
between themselves on the network.36
Music recording companies quickly challenged Napster with a contributory and vicarious
liability infringement action, resulting in an injunction to shut down the service. 37 Napster's
claims that the system was capable of non-infringing use were rejected, 38 as were claims that
online music sharing was fair use.
3 9
Music and movie copyright holders also challenged other popular online file sharing
services which appeared after Napster was shut down, leading many software distributors to
settle claims rather than fight lawsuits.40 The music and movie industry even instigated direct
infringement actions against home users, hoping to reduce end users' copyright infringement.
4 1
E. MGM v. Grokster
Although most file sharing programs clearly were liable for indirect copyright
infringement, Napster raised the question of whether the mere existence or prominence of a
product's non-infringing uses could be sufficient to protect a software distributor from indirect
infringement liability. This question became a key issue in Grokster,42 a case which reached the
Supreme Court in 2005.
Shortly after Napster shut down, Grokster distributed and marketed its free peer-to-peer
file sharing program. 43 Grokster's technology was different in that the Grokster company did not
35 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001). Computer software technology was
available to allow the conversion of a digital compact disc music track into a compressed digital MP3 file, which
then could be copied to other users. Id. This created the potential for one user with a legitimate copy to distribute an
unlimited number of copies to the entire peer-to-peer network. Id.
36 Id. Napster's MusicShare software technology worked by having the main Napster computer servers maintain an
index of the available media of online Napster users, allowing users to quickly search and locate the desired media
to download. Id. As of 2005, the service operating under the Napster brand name is a subscription music service,
allowing users to legally purchase and download copyrighted music that contains digital copyright protection. See
Napster, http://www.napster.com (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
37 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 927 (N.D.Cal. 2000), affd inpart andrev'd inpart, 239
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
38 A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1021. The court found that regardless of the number of infringing versus non-
infringing uses of its service, Napster materially contributed to direct infringement through its "site and facilities."
Id. at 1022.
39Id. at 1015-16.
40 See, e.g., Audiogalaxy Settles Music Piracy Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2002, at D6.
41 Amy Harmon, The Price of Music: 261 Lawsuits Filed On Music Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2003, at A1;
Record Industry Sues More Music Swappers, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2004, at C11.
42 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2777 78 (2005).
4, Id. at 2770.
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actively facilitate user downloads. 44 Rather, users of Grokster technology were solely responsible
for adding, searching, and distributing digital content, through use of the Grokster software.
45
Grokster's defense was twofold. Grokster not only alleged that its software was capable
of substantial non-infringing uses, but also that it did not have any specific knowledge of users'
infringing activity due to the decentralized nature of the file sharing network.46 The Ninth Circuit
agreed, believing that Sony stood for the proposition that liability would not be possible for a
product capable of substantial non-infringing uses unless the distributor had actual knowledge of
specific instances of infringement and failed to act on that knowledge.
47
The Supreme Court overruled, finding that Grokster's advertising and business actions
directly fostered copyright infringement. The Court held that even with evidence of substantial
non-infringing use, "one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright.., is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties."
49
The unanimous Grokster decision was reached due to Grokster's conduct in attracting
and encouraging users to infringe copyrighted materials, as the court found substantial evidence
that Grokster's actions induced the end users' infringement. 50 What the justices disagreed on,
and what remains unclear in current case law, is how Sony should be applied to products
passively allowing infringement, and to what extent non-infringing uses need to exist or be
prominently featured in order to be protected by the Sony safe harbor.
5 1
II. Imposition of Liability on Software Creators and Distributors
A. Software and Copyright Infringement
Popular products facilitating copyright infringement, such as the Betamax VCR and the
Xerox copy machine, might be considered in their own separate category of technical
innovations. 52 The creators of these products were large companies, investing many resources
into developing and marketing such products. In contrast, software has progressively become
44 d. at 2771.
4 Id. Grokster used a decentralized network technology, in which the users of the software contact other user
"nodes" on the network, which sends the file request further down the network until the file is found. Id. Such
technical details of the Grokster network are unlike Napster's centralized service, see supra note 36.
46 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2774-75. The total amount of non-copyrighted works on the Grokster network, or works
known to be in the public domain, was estimated to be less than ten percent. Id. at 2772.
47 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct.
2764.
48 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780 81.
49 Id. at 2778 79. The Court compared such reasoning with an exemption found in the Patent statutes, where that
liability is not exempted from those who distribute a staple article of commerce if they induce patent infringement.
Id. at 2779 n.10; see 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2006) ("Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall
be liable as an infringer.").
50 Id. at 2782. Grokster specifically marketed its service to former Napster users, even attempting to divert internet
queries for Napster to its own web site. Id. at 2781.
51 Compare id at 2783-87 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) with id at 2787-96 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting a number
of differences and unresolved issues in interpreting Sony).
52 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1043 (C.D.Cal. 2003)
(comparing software to VCRs and copy machines).
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easier to create, allowing even non-technical users to develop applications with graphical
software development environments. As this accessibility to computer software development
tools has increased, users have followed by creating applications which have increasingly
challenged the limits of copyright law.
One reason for the overall expansion of computer software applications is abstraction, a
computer science concept which allows advanced functionality to be built upon lower-level,
concrete functionality. 53 Fourth-generation computer programming languages and development
libraries have made software easier and faster to develop, while the software is able to perform
more powerful and complex actions.
54
The functionality of the Internet is a good example of an abstraction. At the lowest level,
electronic signals are sent over data networks.55 At a higher level, these signals represent data
that is split up into discrete pieces and sent to particular network locations. 56 At the highest level,
results of downloaded data from the network are rendered in a web browser. 57 Each abstract level
has its own specialized function, allowing the end product, usually the highest abstraction level,
to function in the most powerful and precise way.
Abstraction found in computer programming languages has similarly made it possible for
developers to easily implement theoretical concepts, such as peer-to-peer networks, without large
expense or expertise. 58 Given the wide accessibility to computer technology permitting
infringement, and the common availability of digital copyrighted media, it is not surprising that
infringement caused by computer software has turned into a problem of staggering proportions.
59
The expansion of future computer software technology is likely to be affected by a wide
variety of legal trends, especially through the development of indirect copyright infringement
liability. Copyright holders cannot efficiently stop millions of infringers by filing individual legal
actions. Instead, their only chance of success is to directly stop the products facilitating
infringement.
60
To understand how copyright infringement liability will have an effect on future software
development and associated abstraction technologies, it is important to first carefully examine
what changes, if any, the Supreme Court has enumerated in its recent Grokster decision.
53 See generally Harold Abelson et al., Structure and Interpretation of Computer Programs (2d ed. 1996), available
at http://mitpress.mit.edu/sicp/full-text/book/book-Z-H- I 0.html.
54 See id.
55 See generally LILLIAN GOLENIEWSKI, TELECOMMUNICATION ESSENTIALS (2001) (describing how electronic
telecommunication networks are operated).
56 For a technical analysis of how internet data is structured and sent between networks, see Russ Schuler, How does
the Internet Work, http://www.theshulers.com/whitepapers/internet whitepaper.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
51 See id
58 The developer of the original version of Napster, Shawn Fanning, was a 19-year-old freshman at a university
when he created a simple program to search and index music files. Brad King, The Day the Napster Died, Wired
News (May 15, 2002), http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,52540,00.html. The program's popularity spread
primarily through its users' word-of-mouth. Id.
59 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2772 (2005). Over 100 million copies
of Grokster's software were known to be downloaded. Id.
60 Id. at 2776.
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B. Unanswered Questions After Grokster
While Grokster seemed to be a clear victory for copyright holders, the Supreme Court
deliberately left a number of unanswered questions relevant to indirect infringement liability.
First, the Court did not clarify what specific role knowledge of unlawful uses has in imposing
infringement liability. 61 It also did not explain to what extent vicarious liability can or should be
imposed, even with regard to a third party's clearly infringing acts. 62 Most importantly, the Court
failed to clearly state when Sony could be applied to infringement-enabling software, leaving an
open question of when a product would be found with enough non-infringing uses to mitigate
any user infringement.
63
1. Is Knowledge Needed For Liability?
The question of whether actual knowledge of specific infringement is necessary for
indirect infringement liability was debated long before Grokster.64 In a case decided by the
Seventh Circuit in 2003, knowledge of users' infringing actions was a critical issue of whether to
impose infringement liability on the distributors of the Aimster peer-to-peer file sharing
service.
65
In Aimster, the file sharing software employed encryption, so that it was impossible for
the service to know whether or not the users were sharing copyrighted materials with each
other. 66 Aimster hoped that the lack of such knowledge would at least prevent contributory
infringement liability. 67 The Seventh Circuit disagreed, reasoning that when a defendant should
know of direct infringement, "[w]illful blindness is knowledge." 68
In contrast, the operators of the Grokster service directly became aware of infringing
uses, 69 and directly encouraged its users to download copyrighted works. 70 The Supreme Court,
however, did not expressly indicate how much weight knowledge of infringement should have in
imposing contributory liability. 
71
61 Id. at 2778 (failing to describe the "point of balance" when liability is imposed from knowledge that unlawful use
will occur).
62 Id. at 2776 n.9 (stating that there was no need to analyze the vicarious liability theory).
63 Id. at 2778 79. The Court said that re-examination of Sony and the balance between protection and commerce
should be left for "a day when that may be required." Id. at 2779.
64 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984); In re Aimster Copyright
Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003).
65 Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650.
6 6 id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2772 (2005).
70 [d.
71 The Court primarily looked at other factors, such as its marketing to users, and its failure to stop copyrighted
content sharing, to impute intent. Id. at 2772. Cf Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 877,
886 87 (N.D.Ill. 2005) (holding that liability could not be imposed without proof of direct infringement and
distributor's knowledge of this infringement).
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It has become clearer that knowledge of direct infringement is not by itself sufficient to
impose contributory infringement liability, 72 but it may help demonstrate the intent to distribute
an infringing product. Thus, the unanswered question is, what degree of knowledge, combined
with a lack of action to stop infringement, demonstrates clear intent to induce infringement?
Would discovering an Internet review of the software showing an infringing use be sufficient?
What about encouraging users to try out new file trading features? Or would unsolicited email
from users, indicating that they primarily use the product for infringement, be sufficient?
73
Placing any weight on the knowledge of users' infringement may be misguided. Once
software is released into the public sphere, it can be copied and executed an unlimited number of
times. Thus, it seems the most logical result that a distributor should not be held liable for an
illegal use if the distributor no longer takes affirmative steps to distribute or facilitate operation
of the program.74
The formulation of liability in Grokster, imposing infringement liability based on the
intent-evidencing affirmative acts of a distributor, would suggest the corresponding conclusion
that without affirmative acts like continuing distribution or operating the infringing service,
liability should not be imposed.75 This may explain why the Court felt that premising liability
only on "purposeful, culpable expression and conduct" would not harm legitimate commerce or
discourage innovation. 76 Under such a standard, no court would reasonably impose liability for
an unforeseen or unexpected use which infringes copyrights.
77
Even with the assurance that some level of infringement-inducing intent is needed, the
level of requisite knowledge of infringing uses should be more precisely defined to allow
software creators and developers to take adequate measures that prevent infringement and avoid
liability. A system of imposing liability, after the fact, for unlikely or unknown uses may have
the effect of limiting innovation by legitimate developers.
78
2. Is Vicarious Liability Applicable?
The Grokster decision also left a large question of whether vicarious liability should be
imposed on the developer of infringing computer software. Excluding Napster, claims of
72 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780 (stating that mere knowledge of infringement would "not be enough" to subject a
distributor to liability).
73 In Grokster, the Court noted that the company received unsolicited emails on how to play copyrighted works, and
responded with "guidance". Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2772. What weight can be placed on such encouragement to
users, however, is unclear.74 See id. at 2780.
75 See id.
76 [d.
77 See id. Contrast the actions taken by Grokster in purposefully marketing their software to demonstrate the
availability of popular songs, "attract[ing] users of a mind to infringe." Id. at 2774.
71 It is questionable what effect copyright law has on "illegitimate" software specifically developed to infringe
copyrights. Current copyright law has proved unable to completely stop such unauthorized uses, but it may prevent
ordinary users who use nothing but commercially released and licensed software from engaging in infringing uses.
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vicarious liability have not been successful in past peer-to-peer software litigation 79 and were not
even considered by the Supreme Court in Grokster.
80
One reason why vicarious liability might be preferred over a contributory liability theory
is because traditionally the law did not require actual knowledge of the infringement. 81 The only
substantive requirement is that the vicarious infringer profits from the infringement and fails to
stop it.
82
Vicarious liability for indirect copyright infringement may no longer be an attractive or
necessary theory for parties to plead, however, as contributory infringement law has continued to
become broader and much more well-defined. In some factual scenarios, contributory
infringement liability can be justifiably imposed on a party even without the knowledge of users'
specific infringing acts. 83 And, based on Grokster's new formulation of imposing contributory
liability when the software creator clearly intends infringement, 84 there are probably no cases
where profiting from infringement will not meet Grokster's inducement standard.
From Grokster's result, it is the author's suggestion that the separate elements of
contributory and vicarious infringement have become encapsulated in a single indirect
infringement liability theory, while courts continue to refer to this theory as "contributory." Such
a result might be viewed as a broader rejection of applying vicarious liability principles to
software developers, but it is more likely that the Court, for convenience, intended to apply its
similar legal concepts in one pronouncement of contributory copyright infringement.
85
The simplification of the infringement liability theory will hopefully give legitimate
developers a clearer standard of how to avoid liability, and give media rights holders more
effective ways of establishing liability. Having a single theory for contributory and vicarious
liability, however, is unlikely to have any effect on borderline cases where a product's uses lie
between clearly infringing and exclusively legitimate.
3. Is Sony a Viable Defense for Infringement-Enabling Software?
The most controversial issue presented to the Court in Grokster was the one which the
court ignored: whether the "substantial non-infringing uses" safe harbor in Sony86 could ever be
applied to products like Grokster's peer-to-peer file sharing software. Both of Grokster's parties
and a number of amici curae argued that defining what a significant non-infringing use is would
79 Compare A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001) with In re Aimster Copyright
Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 654 (7th Cir. 2003).
80 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2776 n.9. The Ninth Circuit held against vicarious liability because Grokster did not
monitor or control the use of the software. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154,
1165 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764.
81 Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
82 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2776.
83 See supra II.B. 1.
84 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780.
85 Cf Telerate Systems, Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 228 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("The theory of vicarious liability
in the context of intellectual property is alternatively called 'contributory infringement").
86 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
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determine whether Grokster would be liable. 87 The Court, instead, bypassed all issues of non-
infringing use by imposing liability based on Grokster's intent to produce an infringing
product.
88
The result of the Court's ignoring of the non-infringing use issue seems to create a large
gap between the uses found legitimate in Sony and the clearly infringing uses in Grokster.89 It is
up to future litigation to determine how to apply Sony in such borderline cases, but the
concurring opinions by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer give some indication of how courts may
approach this issue.
Justice Ginsburg argued that the Sony safe harbor should be strictly construed, requiring
Grokster to demonstrate, "beyond genuine debate," a reasonable prospect that substantial non-
infringing uses were likely to develop in the future.90 Justice Breyer countered with a number of
examples of the non-infringing use of the Grokster software, suggesting that the mere capability
of substantial non-infringing use would be sufficient to invoke the Sony safe harbor.
91
The majority opinion did give limited support for the Sony safe harbor, stating that Sony
struck "a balance between the interests of protection and innovation." 92 Similarly, the majority
viewed its imposition of the inducement rule as "doting] nothing to compromise legitimate
commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful promise."
93
Perhaps Sony's safe harbor is not any sort of testable standard, but instead is an
encouragement for courts to do detailed fact-finding of whether the product in question has such
a lawful promise. This fact-finding process would certainly be very subjective and might err
repeatedly in favor of copyright holders.
The best result for the development of computer software and other technology products
would be to move beyond a subjective measure of future uses, to some sort of rule-based
standard which can be measured in current terms. Manufacturers of technology may not know or
appreciate all of their products' current uses, much less be able to accurately predict whether the
product will have substantial non-infringing uses in the future.
Without a solid affirmation that Sony will be applied to novel and groundbreaking
technology products, it is likely that some commercial developers will not take the risk of
releasing potentially infringing innovations. Even more troubling to all software developers,
however, is the prospect that infringement liability might apply not only to software applications,
but to underlying software technology as well.
III. Infringement From Underlying Computer Technology
8 See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778.
8 Id. at 2780.
89 See Robert A. Kalinsky & Gregory A. Sebald, Intellectual Property Today, at 12 (Aug. 2005).
90 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2786.
9 1 Id. at 2790.92 Id. at 2782; see also id. at 2781 n.12.
93 Id. at 2780.
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In the wake of the Grokster decision, it is clear that technology which is specifically
designed or marketed to facilitate copyright infringement will subject its creator or distributor to
contributory infringement liability.94 What is unclear from any case law, however, is whether
liability can be imposed based on the underlying technology facilitating the infringement.
A. Decentralized Networks
While the file sharing program in Grokster was found to induce its users' infringement,
95
it is questionable what role the underlying decentralized network technology had on the Court's
decision. Decentralized networks pose a unique legal challenge due to their independence and
lack of control once publicly released by their software creators.
96
One reason cited for imposing liability is that through the creation and distribution of
decentralized network software, the creator has materially contributed to the infringement. 97 It is
true that without the software creator, the infringement would never have occurred, but liability
should not be imposed solely on a cause-in-fact argument. If anything, Grokster reinforced the
proposition that a distributor needs to be directly responsible for a certain level of infringement-
inducing fault before being held responsible for users' copyright infringement.
98
Similarly, contributory copyright infringement seems very hard to impose on the creator
of decentralized network software due to the inability of its creator to have specific knowledge of
infringement. 99 However, various methods of hiding knowledge, such as encrypting the users'
activities, probably cannot be viewed as a legitimate way to prevent knowledge of
infringement. 1
00
Even if a software creator originally intended or designed a product for solely legitimate
uses, it is unclear whether courts would respect such a motive if the software easily allows the
user to infringe. 101 Again, asking whether copyright infringement liability would be imposed for
such a product may be a restatement of Grokster's unanswered questions, namely what
constitutes a material contribution to infringement, and what level of knowledge of infringement
is needed. 1
02
94 [d.
9 5 [d. at 2782.
96 See generally Wayne Carroll, I Want My MP3: Secondary Copyright Liability In A Hidden Peer-To-Peer
Network, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 235 (2005) (discussing the history of various peer-to-peer decentralized networks,
including Gnutella, Grokster, and Freenet).
97 See Matthew J. Rust, Casenote, Nobody Uses Betamax Anymore And Neither Should The Supreme Court, 28
HIAMLINE L. REV. 549, 579 (2005).
98 See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780.
99 The argument that liability should not be imposed due to the lack of specific knowledge of users' infringement
was made unsuccessfully in Grokster, but it may have been disregarded because of Grokster's infringement-inducing
acts. Id. at 2778.
10' See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 650-51 (7th Cir. 2003).
101 One decentralized network, Freenet, promotes itself as a "free speech" tool, rather than as a file sharing service.
See Ian Clarke, The Philosophy behind Freenet, http://freenet.sourceforge.net/index.php?page-philosophy (last
visited Jan. 30, 2006).
102 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing requisite level of knowledge needed to impose liability).
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As new uses for Internet technologies emerge, additional legitimate uses for decentralized
networks are likely to be invented and utilized. Once this occurs, legal protection will likely be
extended to the underlying decentralized technology, provided that its use is consistent with the
results in Sony and Grokster. Of course, the creators of decentralized networks argue that
legitimate uses for their technology already exist and are in widespread use today.
B. BitTorrent." Legal or Infringing?
A good example of a decentralized network which has a large potential for legitimate use
is BitTorrent. BitTorrent software was originally designed to efficiently facilitate large file
transfers over its decentralized network by having more of its network users participate in data
distribution. 0 3 The main use of BitTorrent, however, has developed into the distribution of
copyrighted music and movie files. 1
04
Defenders of BitTorrent technology point out major differences between it and other
peer-to-peer technologies.l15 First, unlike many decentralized networks, BitTorrent technology
by itself does not offer a search utility to find content; instead, a user wishing to download any
content must manually find a source from which to download.1
0 6
Second, BitTorrent technology has the capability to show the host who is providing the
copyrighted content, giving copyright holders and Internet service providers an easier
opportunity to identify and shut down infringers. 107 Increased success in stopping such
infringement is unlikely, due to the costs of identifying infringement and the increasing
popularity of BitTorrent. °8 In 2005, files traded with BitTorrent allegedly made up 30 percent of
all Internet data traffic.1
0 9
The best argument for not imposing infringement liability on BitTorrent is the same
reason it facilitates a large amount of infringement: because it is an inexpensive technology for
103 BitTorrent, What is BitTorrent?, http://www.bittorrent.com/introduction.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
BitTorrent, like all peer-to-peer networks, does not use a single source to spread data to many clients. Clive
Thompson, The BitTorrent Effect, Wired Magazine (Jan. 2005), available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.01/bittorrent.html. Instead, the clients themselves help the distribution,
taking advantage of the grid attributes of computer networks. See id. BitTorrent allows even more efficient data
distribution, because each user participates in the distribution, even while they are downloading. See id.
104 The BitTorrent Effect, supra note 103. Because the typical size of a video file is hundreds or thousands of times
larger than a MP3 music file, it would take hours for the average home user to download a video file. Id. However,
the BitTorrent network reduces single-source downloading bottlenecks by maximizing download and upload
capability from multiple sources, allowing short videos like television shows to be downloaded in minutes. See id.
105 See Wikipedia, BitTorrent, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bittorrent (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
106 While the BitTorrent software itself does not provide a mechanism to find copyrighted content, the BitTorrent
website provides a search box to search available content, and can easily find many copyrighted files. See
BitTorrent, http://www.bittorrent.com (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
'0' Wikipedia BitTorrent, supra note 105.10' See generally Gregory Scott Nortman, Indirect Liability of ISPs for Peer-To-Peer Copyright Infringement After
the Verizon Decision, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 249, 256-59 (2005) (discussing the challenges decentralized
networks pose for Internet Service Providers).
109 EDonkeypacks a wallop infile sharing, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 9, 2005, at C6. By July 2005, a similar
decentralized network named EDonkey became more widely used than BitTorrent. Id.
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distributing large amounts of data that may or may not be infringing. 10 Neither peer-to-peer nor
centralized file distribution technologies can distribute data as effectively, and BitTorrent
certainly has the potential for substantial non-infringing uses. II
It is imperative that BitTorrent not be legally viewed as a simple peer-to-peer file sharing
service, but rather as an advanced technology to efficiently distribute data. Without a clear
declaration that legitimate uses of such advanced technology are adequate to prevent indirect
infringement liability, new software applications like BitTorrent will not be widely distributed to
the public, and the full potential of such technologies will never be realized. This consequence
will have the immediate effect of holding back innovative advances which can only be measured
by a product's full-scale deployment among the public.
It may seem that the rights of copyright holders and the collective need for copyright
protection outweighs any amount of legitimate use of BitTorrent or other decentralized networks.
However, unless a more accurate way is developed to balance future non-infringing uses with the
present concerns of copyright holders, harm will likely result to BitTorrent and the application of
many other promising technical concepts.
C. Software Abstraction Liability
Since unrestricted technologies such as BitTorrent have such a high potential for
damaging copyright infringement abuse, copyright holders will likely continue to challenge the
most widely used infringing services and their creators.11 2 Such a result will undoubtedly
persuade many developers to place safeguards against infringement in their software. 
113
It may seem that even as infringement liability expands, the development of overall
software technology will be unaffected, because commercial software developers will find ways
to expand technology while preventing infringement. Thus, specific applications of potentially
infringing technology may never reach the general public. Infringement liability, however, might
still be imposed if these protections are bypassed, or if software is extended to a higher
abstraction.
One area of concern is the imposition of liability on creators of software programming
libraries, or other tools which help develop infringing applications.114 For instance, if a
programming language contains functionality which makes it easy to create an application to
110 See generally, The BitTorrent Effect, supra note 103.
III E.g., current legitimate uses of BitTorrent include distribution of the free Linux operating system, software
patches, and authorized movies. Wikipedia BitTorrent, supra note 105.
112 One decentralized peer-to-peer file sharing network, LimeWire, eventually decided to take an opt-in approach to
downloading, only allowing its users to downloaded pre-approved or licensed material. Slyck News, Lime Wire
Works to Block Unlicensed Material (Sept. 25, 2005), http://www.slyck.com/news.php?story-927.
113 Although it undoubtedly is a wise decision to add such safeguards to software, courts are "unable" to impose
contributory infringement liability on the sole basis that the developer did not add affirmative measures to prevent
infringement. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2781 n.12 (2005).
114 See generally Dennis M. Kennedy, A Primer On Open Source Licensing Legal Issues: Copyright, Copyleft, and
Copyfuture, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 345 (2001) (contrasting types of programming methods found in open
source and commercial software).
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directly infringe copyrights, would liability extend to the distributor of the programming
language? What if the programming language contained extensive functionality to execute an
infringing peer-to-peer program, so that all the developer needed to do was develop a simple user
interface?
Again, a cause-in-fact analysis might hold the developer of such programming
functionality liable for contributing to the infringement, because the infringement would not
have occurred without the underlying functionality. Even if the standard of liability is material
contribution to the infringement, programming languages and tools would likely contain
advanced functionality, without which the infringement would not occur. This reality supports
placing liability on the programming language creator.
There is no current case law to support imposing liability on underlying software
technology for any legal harm, copyright infringement notwithstanding. The closest analogue
might be the imposition of copyright infringement liability on an Internet service provider (ISP),
when its underlying technology is actively used to infringe copyrighted media.115
Even this example has limits, because an ISP is selling a service, and liability is being
imposed for the provision of Internet service to the user, rather than the product provided through
the Internet service itself. Furthermore, Congress created a statutory safe harbor for ISPs in the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), preventing imposition of liability if ISPs assist
copyright holders in stopping infringement.
116
Similarly, the concept of imposing liability on lower abstraction levels might suggest
imposing liability for the creators of lower level Internet technology, such as a new protocol
directly built into the Internet framework which lends itself to infringing uses." 7 By enacting the
DMCA, however, Congress likely intended to impose liability on ISP inaction, rather than on
Internet technology which facilitates infringement.118
Another interesting scenario might occur if a commercial program, which contains
protections against being used for infringement, is modified by its users to facilitate
infringement. (The exact method of modification is not important, but this scenario may give
clues to where the law would impose liability.)
In this hypothetical scenario, Company A produces a widely-used music player software
allowing users to legally copy music from their CDs to their own computers to create a digital
library. This program contains a digital rights protection system so that the music files can only
be played on the original computer and cannot be copied. Also assume that this program has the
ability to see what music other users have and listen to, such as viewing a friend's playlist,
115 See, e.g., Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1087 (C.D.Cal. 2001) (addressing issue of whether
internet service provider could be held liable for facilitating distribution of infringing content).
116 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006); see also Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1088.117 Techniques have been proposed to help improve network transport for certain applications, such as voice over IP
service and streaming multimedia. See, e.g., Wikipedia, Quality of Service, available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualityof Service (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). Similar functionality built into internet
hardware and protocols might improve file sharing or other infringing activities.
"' See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
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although at this point there is no file trading or infringement. The program contains functionality
which would allow users to trade files, but it has been disabled by Company A.
If a software patch became available on the Internet such that the anti-copy and anti-
trading protections became disabled, would Company A be liable, or would the creator of the
patch be liable? Would it be fair to impute the entire fault on the users, since they are committing
direct infringement? What if, instead of a software patch being released, the infringing
functionality could be manually enabled by end users through a simple action, like editing a text
file?
Congress addressed some of these scenarios in the DMCA, making it a crime to directly
circumvent some copyright protection technologies or produce a circumventing tool.' 19 Liability
under the DMCA is imposed on both users and distributors who circumvent a technology that
"effectively controls access" to a copyrighted work, 120 whereas liability is only imposed on
creators and distributors whose tools circumvent technology that "effectively protects" a
copyright owner's right.12 1 Thus, in the example presented, we can assume that the user of
Company A's music player has access to the copyrighted work but is prevented from
redistributing copies of the copyrighted work.
122
If the user downloads a patch from the Internet to enable the music program to copy and
trade files at will, the creator of this patch has likely violated the DMCA.123 But presumably, if
the user takes a simple action, like editing a text file, to copy and trade files at will, he or she has
not manufactured or provided a circumvention tool to the public and has not violated the
DMCA. 124 The user has committed no harm until the he or she takes some action to violate
copyright law, such as by distributing this music file on the Internet. To stop Company A's
software from facilitating such infringement, the only remedy is for the copyright holder to turn
to contributory and vicarious infringement, 125 as the DMCA will not apply to Company A or the
end user. 126
It is probable that if the primary tool of infringement enforcement becomes imposition of
indirect liability, some programmers and software developers will begin to avoid developing
software which involves copyrighted media or its potential creation, storage, or distribution. This
may ultimately hinder legitimate research and product development, leading to technical
stagnation and a lack of incentive to develop certain types of innovative technologies. Some have
119 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006). See generally Amy P. Bunk, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 179 A.L.R. FED. 319 § 7 (2006) (describing the DMCA protections and
exceptions for anti-circumvention technologies).
120 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a). One problem remains is that there is no definite standard or clear interpretation of how
effective an access control protection needs to be in order to warrant inclusion under this section of the DMCA.
121 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b).
122 This means that the "additional violations" section of the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b), would apply.
123 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1); 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(2)(A). This assumes the copyright holder would have standing to
bring an action under the DMCA against the patch creator.
124 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1).125 This assumes that the inducement standard in Grokster will not apply, because Company A would not have the
requisite intent to enable or promote infringing uses. See supra Part I.E.
126 The DMCA itself notes that it is not intended to "enlarge or diminish vicarious or contributory liability." 17
U.S.C. § 1201(c)(2).
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argued that studies reveal a similar chilling effect on scientific research due to the threat of patent
infringement. 1
27
Congress might need to intervene with statutory modification if indirect infringement
liability imposes measurable effects on the software industry. In the meanwhile, it is speculative
to wonder to how far courts will go in imposing liability on underlying software technologies
and their developers.
IV. Effects of Liability on Software Developers
Each of the main areas of industry concerned with indirect infringement liability have
separate goals and aspirations for technology development. Innovative developments in the
computer science field are not confined to commercial research and development; they are
equally likely to arise from academic research, open source development, or even college student
hobbyists. 128
A. Academic Research
Academic research of computer software serves two useful purposes not found
elsewhere. First, it encourages students and researchers to formulate theoretical computer science
concepts examined from academic requirements rather than those of commercial success.129
Second, these theoretical concepts are applied to improve existing technologies often used in
non-academic settings. 130 Since such improvement of software technology often involves
conflict between the accessibility of and the restrictions on intellectual property, it is not
surprising that academic research readily encounters indirect infringement liability issues.
In the DMCA, Congress specifically gave an exemption to educational institutions for
research activities by faculty members and graduate students that would otherwise violate the
anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA. 31 While the DMCA does not specifically address
indirect infringement liability, it is demonstrative of Congress' intent to protect academic
research and its work with potentially infringing technologies.
127 See American Association for the Advancement of Science, Intellectual Property in the AAAS Scientific
Community: A descriptive analysis of the results of a pilot survey on the effects of patenting on science, Oct. 20,
2005, http://sippi.aaas.org/survey/Survey / 20Report / 20ExecSumm.pdf (detailing result of survey showing that 40
percent of scientific researchers have encountered problems with intellectual property rights, including having work
delayed, changed, or abandoned).
128 See supra note 58 and accompanying text (describing how Napster was created by college student Shawn
Fanning).
129 See generally Computing Research Association, Evaluating Computer Scientists and Engineers for Promotion
and Tenure, http://www.cra.org/reports/tenure review.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2006). Academic achievement for
computer science and other academic fields is primarily recognized through publication and peer evaluation, rather
than through commercial success or promotion. See id.
130 See id. (explaining that academic research of computer science and engineering involves theory and
experimentation, with the goal of establishing "better" inventions).
131 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(e) (2006) ("infringing activities shall not be attributed to the institution" if the
educational institution provides copyright information to its system users and takes steps to
promote compliance with copyright law).
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An example of a new technology being developed in academic and private research is
nanotechnology, which can reasonably be compared to today's computer software technology.
Hypothetical nanotech manufacturing may eventually be able to duplicate and infringe any form
of property on a molecular scale. 132 Indirect infringement liability for both copyright and patents
will certainly be a possibility once nanotechnology is able to mature to a commercially
successful point.
Ideally, infringement liability should not be a concern for the academic research of
nanotechnology, or any other undeveloped technology. Any concern about the infringement
implications of a product should not occur until a product is widely used or released into the
public sphere. Rather than taking an approach of not trying to develop infringing products,
researchers should attempt to understand them as completely as possible, by receiving
encouragement to apply new inventive concepts.
Researchers and creators of potential infringement-enabling products should be aware of
indirect infringement liability, but they should not be convinced that mere production or even
release of such a product will be enough to subject themselves to indirect infringement liability.
However, academic researchers should understand the implications of Grokster and its
encouragement to not display an infringing intent or other culpable behavior. If these precautions
are taken, academic research should be able to operate without significant interference from
indirect copyright liability.
B. Open Source Software
Some of the purposes of academic research can also be found in open source software.
Open source software is defined as software providing access to the underlying programming
source code, without significant restrictions on use or redistribution. 133 The goal of open source
is to encourage the evolution of computer software through freely sharing information and its
underlying technical knowledge. 1
34
Many open source programs and development projects are designed to emulate
commercially available software, while implementing new technological innovations and
features. 135 Open source software is even touted to promote software reliability and quality,
because more programmers are given the opportunity to critique and improve the source code. 
136
132 See Francisco Castro, Legal and Regulatory Concerns Facing Nanotechnology, 4 CHi.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.
140, 144 (2004). The development and use of nanotechnology also presents a number of socio-political implications,
as it has the potential to be deployed in a wide variety of industries, from medical devices to military weapons. Id. at
142.
133 Open Source Initiative, The Open Source Definition, available at http://www.opensource.org/docs/definition.php
(last visited Jan. 30, 2006). Most forms of Open Source software use a copyright-enabled license to ensure that
further uses or extensions of the software provide access to the source code and the license. See id.
134 Id.
135 Kenneth J. Rodriguez, Closing The Door On Open Source: Can The General Public License Save Linux and
Other Open Source Software?, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 403 (2005). One of the most popular open source applications is
the Linux operating system, which has become widely used both in private and commercial settings. Id.
136 Id.
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Freely sharing source code and advancing technology seems a noble goal, but it exposes
an indirect infringement liability problem when software can be easily designed to facilitate
copyright infringement. This raises two important questions specific to open source software: Is
it possible that open source developers who place un-compiled source code on the Internet can
be liable if this code is launched by a user for infringing purposes? And what happens when such
open source software was originally designed for substantial non-infringing uses?
Even if the open source program was specifically designed for copyright infringement or
blatantly induces user infringement, liability may not be able to be imposed on any party. Many
open source projects have a large number of anonymous contributors unable to be identified.' 37
Most importantly, stopping distribution of the program is useless if the users have the source
code and are able to re-launch the infringing service. 1
38
Another complexity with open source software is that the distributed code of a legitimate
program might be modified by users to commit infringing acts. Similarly, copyright protections
built into open source software may be easily bypassed, because the very nature of open source
software prevents creators from effectively placing tamper-proof protections for digital media. 1
39
In each of these complications, it is likely that the inducement theory expounded upon in
Grokster 140 will determine whether to hold the creators of open source software indirectly liable.
However, if multiple developers are involved with designing different parts of the software, and
no legal entity promotes the use of the software, liability may be impossible to impute to any
particular party except the end user.
The open source community often views disclosure of programs and source code as a free
speech issue. 141 But open source cannot be given such broad protection if open source programs
are used to openly destroy other forms of intellectual property. Open source software developers
need to realize that taking responsibility for their work and encouraging the open source
community to comply with current copyright restrictions may be the only way to prevent more
burdensome future legal regulations.
142
C. Commercial Software
137 See Ryan Roemer, The Digital Evolution: Freenet and the Future of Copyright on the Internet, 2002 UCLA J.L.
& TECH. 5.
138 See id. This exact problem may occur with the Freenet peer-to-peer software program, as the program and its
source code has become so widely distributed that the distribution network could be easily re-launched, even if the
Freenet developers no longer distribute the program. See supra note 101.
139 Joseph Gratz, Note, Reform in the "Brave Kingdom ": Alternative Compensation Systems for Peer-To-Peer File
Sharing, 6 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 399, 413 (2004).
141 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2780 (2005).
141 See Free Software Foundation, Free Software Definition, http://www.fsf.org/licensing/essays/free-sw.html (last
visited Jan 30, 2006) ("'Free software' is a matter of liberty, not price. To understand the concept, you should think
of 'free' as in 'free speech,' not as in 'free beer."'). See also Clarke, supra note 101.
142 Open source developers are concerned with changes to copyright law, fearing any significant change because
open source relies on copyright licensing models to ensure that source code stays open and redistributable. See
CHRISTOPHER WOLF, DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT: TEXT, HISTORY, AND CASELAW 591 (1 st ed. 2003).
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Most commercial software developers need not be concerned with indirect copyright
infringement, because many commercial software applications do not involve the use or handling
of others' copyrighted works. This may change as digital multimedia becomes more integrated
into user applications, leading commercial software developers to regularly encounter
infringement issues.
The very definition of commercial software, creating software for a profit, means that
developers will, at a minimum, indirectly profit from the infringing uses of their software.
Similarly, the sale or distribution of software is usually sufficient to make a software creator
distributor aware of its infringing uses. Because the elements of contributory or vicarious
infringement can be easily proved, liability is understandably a major concern if the software
deals with copyrighted works.
Even if a software distributor does not clearly induce its users' infringing acts, software
companies may spend considerable resources litigating this issue. 143 Similarly, there is also
concern that a product's advertising and marketing would be scrutinized in an attempt to prevent
any sort of an infringing intent from being exhibited.
144
One way of preventing harm to the commercial software industry is to allow a safe
harbor similar to that existing for ISPs under the DMCA. 145 Such a safe harbor would prevent
imposition of liability on a software developer if the developer cooperates to stop the infringing
activity, such as by stopping distribution or modifying the program. 146 Copyright holders may
argue that such an approach would encourage developers to test the limits of liability, but the
inducement approach formulated in Grokster should prevent the most harmful infringement-
inducing behavior.
The liability issues for commercial and non-commercial software have a common link,
namely the outstanding potential of substantial non-infringing uses. It should be clear that
protection of substantial non-infringing uses is critical to the success and development of new
technology applications, in all industry settings. Copyright holders should not view potentially
infringing software technology as another means to infringe copyrights but, instead, should
encourage legitimate applications of developing technology to increase media marketability.
Investing in new media technologies, rather than fighting them, should have the dual result of
benefiting technology and media holders, one of the main purposes of having intellectual
property protection.
D. An Argument for Expanding Liability
Due to the previously discussed harms realized through imposing copyright infringement
liability, it seems logical to reduce and limit liability for many computer software applications.
143 See Kalinsky & Sebald, supra note 89.
144 See id.
145 See supra Part III.C; 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
146 The level of cooperation required to stop infringing uses might still place a heavy burden on software developers.
For example, in the Napster case, the district court imposed "zero tolerance" for infringement, a standard which the
Napster company was not able to meet, even after working with record companies to remove copyrighted materials.
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2002).
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There may be limited circumstances, however, where the expansion of liability will prove
beneficial to software creators and overall technology development.
The first argument for imposing liability is that it is necessary before copyrighted works
can be safely introduced to new technology platforms. If the ultimate goal of the copyright
system is to promote the useful development of the arts, 147 then protection should be zealously
given to new digital forms of media. Protections enumerated in the DMCA to encourage digital
protection technologies 148 are a good starting point. More involvement by Congress may be
needed to ensure that copyright protection is available and effective with new media forms.
Second, relatively few contributory infringement suits have been brought against
technology providers, with the exception of peer-to-peer file sharing programs. 149 And in most
cases, these peer-to-peer programs were designed for the primary purpose of infringing
copyrighted material.15 0 The broad legal standard for indirect infringement formulated by peer-
to-peer litigation may not be relevant for other types of computer software, because most
software is not primarily designed to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted media. Thus,
imposition of liability may not have the feared chilling effects on the development of new
innovations. 15
Finally, it is possible that imposing liability on developers for potentially infringing
technologies will result in more developers taking steps to prevent infringement and liability in
their own products. This will have the dual effect of preventing infringement from ever occurring
and encouraging a large amount of research and development in necessary copyright-protection
technologies. Both of these results will have a net positive effect on the software industry and
end users.
Conclusion
From the perspective of an end user, there may not be much distinction between
borrowing a VCR-recorded copy of a favorite television show from a friend and downloading the
same show on a peer-to-peer network. The content is the same, and infringement probably has
occurred in both cases, but current copyright law only applies indirect infringement liability to
the developer of the peer-to-peer program. This result makes even less sense when some parties
involved in the Internet download, such as ISPs who profit from data transmission, have an
opportunity to escape liability. Instead, the developer of the peer-to-peer software program must
147 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2793 94
(2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
148 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2006) (enumerating anti-circumvention provisions for digital copyright protection
technologies).
149 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that given the nature of the Sony rule, there is
"nothing in the briefs or the record that shows that Sony has failed to achieve its innovation-protecting objective").
150 See, e.g., Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2764 (peer-to-peer software marketed and distributed for primary purpose of
infringing copyrights); In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 646-47 (7th Cir. 2003) (similar infringing
objective exhibited in distributing peer-to-peer file sharing software).
151 But see Electronic Frontier Foundation, Supreme Court Ruling Will Chill Technology Innovation (June 27, 2005),
http://www.eff org/news/archives/2005 06.php (claiming that "inventors and entrepreneurs will not only bear the
costs of bringing new products to market, but also the costs of lawsuits if consumers start using their products for
illegal purposes").
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rely on a vague, judicially-created "substantial, non-infringing use" test that has been weakened
by Grokster.
These contradictory results should have an underlying rational basis imposed by
Congress through statutory copyright considerations rather than by an over-extension of common
law liability. At the very minimum, some type of a safe harbor is needed to protect the interests
of legitimate academic and commercial software developers. Such a measure is not needed to
protect developers from over-zealous copyright holders, but is needed to encourage the
development of increasingly demanded multimedia software and its associated creation, storage,
and distribution technologies.
Congress, rather than the courts, is in a much better position to balance all parties'
underlying interests to determine which developing uses should be protected versus which uses
pose too great of a risk to copyright holders. This undoubtedly will require separating the
underlying abstract computing technology from rogue and infringement-inducing applications of
the technology. Leaving the determination of where to draw this distinction to uncertain
litigation cannot have a positive impact on any industry, especially in one as dynamic as
computer software.
The most positive result for the development of computing software would find the
Supreme Court ascribing to its own reasoning in Sony when examining the next new technology
to challenge copyright law. "It may well be that Congress will take a fresh look at this new
technology, just as it so often has examined other innovations in the past. But it is not our job to
apply laws that have not yet been written."
152
"' Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
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